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I. Introduction
We must not say that every mistake is a foolish one.1
In this Article I first argue that Section 62 of the Restatement (Third)
of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment sits in tension with the principles
expounded in the rest of the work. I then try to show that this tension is
mostly unnecessary because the majority of the cases covered by Section 62
could be either (1) explained by the rules of other sections or (2) dismissed
as quaint products of a bygone era dominated by a robust conception of
equity. I conclude that the Section should not have been included in the
Restatement. However, in fairness, I must acknowledge that a reporter,
striving to create a comprehensive Restatement, faces constant pressure to
accommodate more cases, even though he may disagree with the reasoning
within the cases. Hence, overinclusion is to be expected. Still, the
inclusion of Section 62 remains a mistake, albeit not a foolish one.
∗ Adam Rigoni, University of Michigan. Special thanks to Professor Douglas
Laycock.
1. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE DIVINATIONE 2.90.
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My criticism of Section 62 is limited to the illustrations discussed and
the cases referenced in Comments a–b. Comment c deals with limitations
on the remedy a plaintiff receives in a restitution suit. It is not clear why
this aspect of calculating the plaintiff’s recovery is placed in a section
ostensibly dealing with defenses to a claim of unjust enrichment.
Moreover, Section 49’s rules for calculating recovery, which include a rule
that the measurement of recovery varies with the culpability of the
defendant, seem to render this portion of Section 62 redundant.
Nevertheless, a full explication of these criticisms of Comment c would
tread too far from the criticism of Comments a–b to merit discussion in this
paper. Hence, when I write of Section 62, I mean to refer to that Section
sans Comment c.
II. The Tension Generated by Section 62 in General
Section 62 states:
Even if the claimant has conferred a benefit that results in the unjust
enrichment of the recipient when viewed in isolation, the recipient may
defend by showing some or all of the benefit conferred did not unjustly
enrich the recipient when the challenged transaction is viewed in the
2
context of the parties’ further obligations to each other.

This raises the following question: Why is "no unjust enrichment" a
defense to an allegation of unjust enrichment as opposed to a proper
answer? Kull responds by explaining:
[T]he practical application of the present rule is to [cases] . . . when the
claimant alleges facts supporting a prima facie claim in unjust
enrichment . . . but the recipient is able to show that the resulting
enrichment is not unjust in view of the larger transactional context
3
within which the benefit has been conferred.

Hence Section 62 is not merely an assertion that the plaintiff fails to state a
claim, but a defense available only in specific circumstances.
This general response implies that any case covered by Section 62 will
sit in tension with whatever sections give rise to the "prima facie claim in
unjust enrichment." The strength of the prima facie claim that Section 62
denies varies with each case, but each case will create at least some tension
with other sections. Thus, by Kull’s own lights, Section 62 serves as a
2.
3.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 (2011).
Id. § 62 cmt. a.
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repository for cases with results that seem incongruent with those found in
other sections.
It would be troublesome enough if Section 62 were merely a
repository for misfit cases; however, the situation is much worse. In some
of the cases, such as Illustration 1, the result and reasoning is so
inconsistent with other sections that it ought to be rejected. In other cases
the result is consistent with other sections; in fact, the result follows from
reasoning enunciated in other sections. However, that these results are not
explained in the other sections and instead find themselves amongst misfit
cases in Section 62 implies that those results cannot be explained by other
sections. Hence, even the cases with correct results end up generating
tension with the other sections.
It might be objected that there is no such implication because Kull
never claims that the explanations in Section 62 are the only possible
explanations for the results therein. He acknowledges that some results are
overdetermined. However, this objection is unconvincing for two reasons.
First, as discussed above, Kull admits that all the cases in Section 62
involve a prima facie case of unjust enrichment. By making the prima facie
claim salient, Kull thereby makes salient the sections that form the basis for
the prima facie claim. When he then goes outside the principles of those
sections to explain the result, he creates a strong implication that doing so is
necessary to reach the result. Second, the rule of Section 62 is a defense
against a claim in restitution and thus it serves as a response to an otherwise
valid claim. It would be odd to explain the denial of a claim as the result of
an application of a defense if the claim itself is invalid. This suggests that
the results found in Section 62 can be reached only by applying the rules
found therein. Moreover, the reasoning used to explain results in Section
62 is disconcertingly vague and expansive, more so than that found in the
other sections of the Restatement. Hence, even if Kull is not implying that
the rule of Section 62 is the exclusive explanation of the results, he should
still put the cases within the sections that better explain the results.
The Mansfield-era equity underpinnings of Section 62 are another
source of tension between Section 62 and the rest of the Restatement. In
the comment to Section 1, which elucidates general principles of restitution,
Kull writes:
A significant tradition within English and American law refers to unjust
enrichment as if it were something identifiable a priori, by the exercise
of a moral judgment anterior to legal rules. This equitable conception of
the law of restitution is crystallized by Lord Mansfield’s famous
statement in Moses v. Macferlan: "In one word, the gist of this kind of
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action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged
by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." . . .
Restitution in this view is the aspect of our legal system that makes the most
direct appeal to standards of equitable and conscientious behavior . . . .
At the same time, the purely equitable account of the subject is open to
substantial objections. . . . In numerous cases natural justice and equity do
not in fact provide an adequate guide to decision, and would not do so even
if their essential requirements could be treated as self-evident. . . . [Under
this interpretation it] is difficult to avoid the objection that sees in "unjust
enrichment,". . . at worst, an open-ended and potentially unprincipled
charter of liability.

....
The concern of restitution is not, in fact, with unjust enrichment in any such
broad sense, but with a narrower set of circumstances giving rise to what
might more appropriately be called unjustified enrichment. Compared to
the open-ended implications of the term "unjust enrichment," instances of
unjustified enrichment are both predictable and objectively determined,
because the justification in question is not moral but legal.4

Here, Kull is rightly arguing that unjust enrichment, at least in its present
form, is not an open invitation for judges to impose their moral sentiments
upon the parties. For example, morality likely requires that a pitiful
pregnant widow receive help in keeping her home, but that does not give
her a restitution claim against her landlord for refusing to lower her rent.
Kull’s criticism of the hoary conception of equity is well-founded
and persuasive. Yet Section 62 states precisely such an antiquated view.
Moses makes a triumphant return in the Reporter’s Note to Section 62, as
Kull writes, "Illustrations 1–4 are all within the scope of the well-known
hypothetical cases put by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan."5 He
continues in the note to approvingly quote Mansfield’s opinion in Moses:
This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought not
in justice to be kept, is very beneficial . . . It lies only for money
which, ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to refund . . . in all these
cases [in which the plaintiff’s restitution claim is denied], the
defendant may retain it with a safe conscience, though by positive law
6
he was barred from recovering.

4. Id. at § 1 cmt. b (citations omitted).
5. Id. § 62 reporter’s note b (citations omitted).
6. Id. (quoting Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760))
(emphasis added).
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It is startling to see Kull quoting the very same opinion that served in
Section 1 as the exemplar of the theory of restitution that the Restatement
rejects as flawed and outdated. Kull argued convincingly that we ought to
understand "unjust enrichment" as "unjustified enrichment," where
"unjustified" refers not to a priori moral principles but rather to objective
principles of positive law.7 Yet in the quotation above, Mansfield
explicitly says that the decision is based on who in equity and good
conscience (ex aequo et bono) ought to have the money, even though the
positive law compels a different result. Thus, the Reporter’s Note for
Section 62 stands in direct contrast to the reasoning in Section 1. In fact,
they are not merely contrasting, but the comment to Section 1 explicit
attacks the reasoning endorsed in the Reporter’s Note to Section 62. This
creates not just tension but open conflict between the two Sections.
Accordingly, Section 62 is a source of great dissonance within the
Restatement. It stands in contrast with both the rules of specific sections
and the general principles that were supposed to underlie all of restitution.
If the purpose of the Restatement were purely normative—to lay out how
the law of restitution ought to be—then it would be clear that Section 62
should have been removed. But the Restatement has more complicated
goals. It strives to present the best theory that explains restitution as it is
found in the case law. The reporter must balance trying to accommodate
the results and reasoning in multifarious and sometimes contradictory
cases with other theoretical virtues such as simplicity and consistency.
Thus, before concluding that the Section should not have been
included in the Restatement, it is necessary to determine whether
removing the Section would have created gains in consistency that
outweigh the corresponding losses in explanatory power (i.e., the
reduction in the number and importance of the cases explained by the
principles of the Restatement). This section has shown that the gain in
consistency would be significant. The next two sections demonstrate that
the loss in explanatory power is slight relative to the gains in consistency.
III. The Illustrations in Section 62 Are Either Wrong or Explained by
Other Sections
Before looking at the cases cited in the Reporter’s Note to Section 62, it
is necessary to examine the illustrations. As the illustrations are supposed
7.

See id. § 1 cmt. b.
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to be representative of a number of cases, inspecting them allows us to
quickly deal with a number of cases by proxy. Most of the illustrations
can be explained by rules from other sections. The remaining illustrations
are so inconsistent with the principles found elsewhere in the Restatement
that they should be rejected as wrong. Illustration 1 is as follows:
A owes B $5000, but (unknown to either party) the debt is no longer
enforceable because the statute of limitations has run. A pays B, then
learns that his payment could not have been legally compelled. A has a
prima facie claim to restitution of the mistaken payment (§ 6), but B is
not unjustly enriched by A’s payment of a valid but unenforceable debt.
B is not liable to A in restitution. (For the contrasting outcome when
A’s payment of a prescribed debt is compelled by a judgment that is
8
subsequently reversed, see §18, Comment e, Illustration 8.)

A has a strong prima facie claim based on mistaken payment. It is explicit
in the illustration that he paid under the mistaken belief that the debt was
enforceable, and it seems very likely that such a mistake is present in any
case where one pays an unenforceable debt and subsequently sues to
recover the payment in restitution. B has no legal claim to the money.
Thus, there has been unjustified enrichment. What justifies denying A’s
restitution claim if not an appeal to equity and good conscience?
One purported justification is to argue that B does have a legal claim to
the money. This tact is taken by the court in Jordan v. Bergsma,9 which
distinguishes a statute of limitations from a statute of nonclaim. The
Jordan court argued that when a statute of limitations has run, the legal
obligation remains, but the law withholds any remedy for the enforcement
of the obligation.10 Contrastingly, when a statute of nonclaim has run, the
legal obligation is extinguished. This justification is clever, but the
distinction it draws is intolerably subtle and ad hoc. The result of either the
statute of limitations or the statute of nonclaim running is the same in all
instances except those like Illustration 1. The only practical difference
between statutes of limitations and statutes of nonclaim is that the latter are
not subject to equitable tolling, a distinction that is irrelevant in the context
of Illustration 1.11
Further, Kull does not draw the proffered distinction, so it is unlikely
that Illustration 1 was supposed to represent cases where a statute of
8.
9.
10.
11.
1996).

Id. § 62 cmt. b.
Jordan v. Bergsma, 822 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
See id. at 320.
See Kubby v. Shaffer (In re Estate of Kubby), 929 P.2d 55, 56–57 (Colo. Ct. App.
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limitations has run but not cases where a statute of nonclaim has run. If
Kull intended to use such a subtle distinction to explain the result in
Illustration 1, then surely he would have made it explicit. Therefore, this
response fails to address the gist of the Illustration, even though it may
technically explain the result.
A second possible justification is that B has a legal claim to money on
the basis of a claim in restitution (i.e., B has no contractual claim on the
money but he does have a claim for performance under an agreement that
cannot be enforced pursuant to Section 31). A valid restitution claim is a
legal claim, so B would have a legal right to the money if he has a valid
claim in restitution. Unfortunately, Section 31 explicitly rules this out,
stating, "[t]here is no claim under this section if enforcement of the
agreement is barred by the applicable statute of limitations."12
However, the second attempt points the way to a more plausible
justification. Perhaps giving A a claim in restitution defeats the policy
behind statutes of limitations, which is the basis of her claim in the first
place. As the Supreme Court put it, "[l]imitations periods are intended to
put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from
sleeping on their rights,"13 to which we might add a policy to avoid
burdening courts with trials based on stale evidence. Denying A’s claim
certainly lessens the incentive for B to timely prosecute his claim, but it is
also true that in this Illustration, A is the party pursuing a trial based on stale
evidence. After all, A is bringing a suit that she could have avoided by
paying attention to the statute of limitations and not paying B in the first
place. One might argue that allowing A to bring a suit on an old claim
defeats the policy behind the statute of limitations. Therefore, the argument
goes, denying A recovery gives people in her position incentive not to make
the mistaken payment or at least not to waste the court’s time with a suit
based on stale evidence.
This argument is misguided for four reasons. First and foremost, the
statute of limitations is directed at the holder of a claim. A does not have a
claim until she makes the mistaken payment, while B has a claim from the
moment A defaults. It is strange to think that the policy of the statute
supports failing to penalize B in these circumstances.
Second, the gravamen of A’s claim is not based on the old debt, but on
her recent payment to B. While evidence regarding the old debt is likely to
come up, it does not form the basis for A’s claim. In fact, it is in A’s
12.
13.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 (2011).
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983).
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interest to say as little as possible about the old debt, because she would do
better casting her claim as paying B money by mistake. Her claim is that B
received money to which he has no legal entitlement; clearly this claim is
not helped by evidence of a preexisting entitlement. The evidence
regarding the old debt is going to be introduced by the defendant as part of
his defense under Section 62.14 Hence it is not A’s claim but B’s defense
that requires the court to deal with old evidence.
Third, it is not at all clear that denying A’s claim will have the
practical effect of supporting the policy of the statute of limitations.
Denying A’s claim clearly gives her less incentive to bring the suit and
more incentive to make sure the statute of limitations has not run before she
pays B. However, the debtors are much less likely than creditors to take
such considerations into account. On the other hand, it also gives B, who is
likely to be more legally sophisticated and hence more sensitive to legal
incentives, less incentive to bring his claim in a timely manner. Yet such a
slight shift in incentives is not likely to alter the behavior of actual
creditors, because no creditor is going to let a claim lapse on the slight
chance that the debtor will voluntarily and mistakenly pay after the statute
of limitations has run. As denying A’s claim has little effect on the policy
underlying statutes of limitations, that policy cannot justify the result of the
Illustration.
Fourth, in almost every realistic circumstance, a restitution claim of
this sort will involve a request or inducement by B toward A. It seems
highly unlikely that a debtor who remained in default for more than the
entire limitations period would decide to pay the debt without any action on
the part of the creditor, only to later bring an action in restitution to recover
the amount paid. Although Illustration 1 stipulates that neither party knows
that the statute of limitations has run, in reality A will not know, prior to
discovery, that B lacks this knowledge. Therefore in nearly every realistic
case similar to the Illustration, there will be a claim for fraud based on B
representing that he had an enforceable claim in addition to the restitution
claim based on mistaken payment.15 The fraud case is not barred by the
rule of Section 62, so the plaintiff will attempt to prove (1) that the statute
of limitations has run and (2) that the creditor is aware that it has run. His
14. At best, A will stipulate to the existence of the debt, which B will not contest. This
also eliminates the concerns about old evidence. Admittedly, there may still be dispute
about the date on which the debt was created, but that dispute arises out of B’s defense, not
A’s claim.
15. See, e.g., Clifton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 577 (1935); Jordan v.
Bergsma, 822 P.2d 319 (1992).
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attempt to prove (1) is going to involve all the same old evidence that the
mistaken payment claim would have involved. Hence the court has not
avoided litigation dealing with stale evidence. Furthermore, the fraud case
is going to involve a messy determination of whether the creditor had
knowledge regarding the statute of limitations, which could have been
avoided by allowing the debtor to recover on her restitution claim.
Thus, the result in Illustration 1 has no good explanation. It sits in
such direct contrast with the other cases of mistake in Section 6 that it ought
to be dismissed as wrongly decided. It also sits in contrast with Section 18,
Comment e, Illustration 8, which is as follows:
A sues B to enforce a $5000 debt. B defends on the basis of the statute
of limitations. The trial court holds that the statute does not bar the
action, and A obtains a judgment that B satisfies. A’s judgment is
reversed on appeal, on the ground that the action was time-barred. It is
conceded that B’s debt to A was legal and valid, and that it would have
been enforceable were it not for the statute of limitations. B is entitled
16
to restitution nevertheless.

Kull tries to explain this discontinuity in the following manner:
When the case is within this section, the debtor has been compelled by
law to pay a claim that is not legally enforceable. The need to remedy
this misapplication of legal process—so that the law not stultify itself by
requiring what it has declared may not be required—constitutes an
important reason for restitution that is independent of the individualized
equities of the parties. This public concern with the integrity and proper
application of legal coercion has no application to a case in which a
debtor has paid, without compulsion, money to which the creditor had a
valid but not a legally enforceable claim.17

This explanation is inadequate because it fails to explain why the law
should not be seen as stultifying itself when it denies A’s claim to
restitution in Illustration 1. The court in Illustration 1 is in effect enforcing
a debt that it has declared not legally enforceable. Refusing to grant
restitution enforces the debt by providing it legal protection that it would
not otherwise have. Although this enforcement takes effect only after A has
made a mistake, it is enforcement nonetheless. The law still stultifies itself.
Kull’s point about compulsion fares better than his contention about
the law stultifying itself. A’s payment in Illustration 1 is more voluntary
than B’s in Illustration 8. However, Kull overstates the degree of this
16.
17.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 18 cmt. e (2011).
Id.
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difference. B faces a judgment against him, but he does have the option of
posting a bond pending appeal.18 While this option certainly does not eliminate
the element of compulsion facing B, it does lessen the degree of compulsion
involved. Moreover, A in Illustration 1 is acting under the assumption that she
could be subject to a judgment against her, which no doubt constrains her choice.
Finally, both Illustrations can be cast as instances of the same mistake. A in
Illustration 1 and B in Illustration 8 both mistakenly believes that they have a
legal obligation to pay a debt, and both pay their respective debts on the basis of
that belief. Yet under Section 62, only one of them gets restitution.
Hopefully it is clear that Illustration 1 can be rejected without doing much
violence to the Restatement. Turning to Illustrations 2 and 3,* they read as
follows:
2.

A owes B $5000. Intending to pay C, another creditor, A sends
$5000 to B who accepts the payment despite notice of A’s mistake.
(B’s notice of A’s mistake means that B is not entitled to defend as a
payee for value by the rule of § 67.) A has a prima facie claim to
restitution of the mistaken payment (§ 6), but B is not unjustly
enriched by A’s unintended payment of a valid debt. B is not liable
to A in restitution.

3.*

Receiver of insolvent Association issues an assessment against each
Member in the amount of $1000. Some Members pay the
assessment, but others resist. In litigation between Receiver and
recalcitrant Members, it is determined that the duty of the Members
runs only to Association’s Creditors, not to Association itself. In
consequence, Receiver had no legal authority to compel payment of
the assessment. Nevertheless, Members who paid the assessment
have no claim against Receiver (who has since made payment over
to Creditors, Section 65), nor against Creditors (who have a defense
by the rule of this section). Paying Members are entitled to
19
restitution from nonpaying Members by the rule of § 23.

Illustration 3* can be explained via the creditors qualifying under
Section 67 as payees for value without notice, but Illustration 2 cannot. Both
Illustrations can be explained as the court consolidating two different
judgments in the name of efficiency: (1) a judgment that the defendant is
liable in restitution and (2) a judgment that the plaintiff is liable on the debt.
18. See id. § 62 reporter’s note c.
19. Id. § 62 cmt. b.
* This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section
62 has since been removed from the final version. Subsequent references to this nowremoved Illustration will be marked with an asterisk. References to Illustration 3 of Section
62 without an asterisk refer to the final version of the Restatement.
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The court allows (1) to be offset by (2) with the result that the defendant
owes no money. This explanation works well enough for Illustration 3,*
where there is no explicit concern that other creditors will go unpaid, but it is
a poor explanation of Illustration 2.
To see why that explanation is unsatisfactory, the context in which it
makes sense for A to bring a restitution claim must be considered.20 If both
debts are enforceable and A is able to pay both of them, then the explanation
above is adequate. However, in such a situation, it does not make sense for A
to sue B in the first place, because even if A wins, he will still have to pay B
eventually and it is doubtful that B will be hesitant to enforce the debt after
losing in court. It makes sense for A to sue only when he is unable to pay
both of his debts and must decide to default on one of the two debts. He may
choose to default on his debt to B for a number of reasons: the contract with
the other creditor (C) might have a severe liquidated damages clause or C
might be an important supplier in A’s line of work and hence A cannot afford
to upset him. Whatever his reason, he finds his plans irreversibly thwarted as
result of a mistake, while B keeps the money despite having notice of the
mistake.
More importantly, this leaves C at least partially unpaid. C has a prima
facie claim in restitution against B under the rules of Section 47 and 48 for
benefits received by defendant from a third party.21 Yet this claim must fail,
because Section 62 deems B not unjustly enriched. In effect, B receives a
priority superior to that of C as a result of the mistake. Further, Illustration 2
anomalously allows a defendant to retain a benefit despite having notice that
it was received as a result of a mistake.
In light of the aforementioned concerns, Illustration 2 is simply wrong
and should be removed from the Restatement. Illustration 3, on the other
hand, is correct and nicely explained by Section 67 or as the result of
offsetting a restitution claim with the defendant’s claim on the debt. The
remaining illustrations can be dealt with rather easily. Illustration 3 is as
follows:
3.

A agrees to settle a debt by giving B a promissory note for $5000,
payable in two years with interest. By a clerical error, the note
delivered by A to B omits any reference to interest. The note is

20. The actual case upon which Illustration 2 is based is examined infra Part IV. The
case itself differs substantially from Illustration 2.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 47, 48
(2011).
* This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section
62 has since been removed from the final version.3
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thereafter negotiated by B to C, and by C to D, all parties acting
in the mistaken belief that the note calls for payment of interest.
At maturity, A pays D $5000 plus accrued interest of $600.
When he examines the canceled instrument, A discovers that
interest was not due by its terms; whereupon A sues D to
recover $600 by the rule of § 6. D is not liable to A in
restitution, because (viewing the transaction as a whole) D has
22
not been unjustly enriched at A’s expense.

This result can be explained as repeated applications of the contract
doctrine of reformation.23 In every one of the transactions, the parties’
intentions involved a note for $5,000 plus interest. A does not have a claim
in restitution because D has a legal right to have the note reformed to
include interest as between himself and C. C has a right to have the note
reformed to include interest as between himself and B. B has the right to
have the note reformed as between himself and A. It is safe to assume that
each of the intermediaries would want the note reformed to avoid liability
for the interest, so the court simply follows the chain of reformations back
to the beginning.
Illustration 4 is as follows:
3.

A pays B $5000 in settlement of A’s losses in an honest poker
game. Under local law, a gambling debt of this kind is illegal
and unenforceable; but (unlike the law of some jurisdictions)
no statute authorizes the recovery of such a payment once
made. A’s payment of an illegal obligation might give him a
prima facie claim to recover $5000 by the rule of § 32, but B is
not unjustly enriched by the receipt of money won by an honest
wager. (The fact that A had a fair chance of winning means
that A has received "the counterperformance specified by the
parties’ unenforceable agreement" within the meaning of
24
§ 32(2).) B is not liable to A.

As Kull points out in the parenthetical, this result can be explained by
applying Section 32(2)’s provision stating that there is no unjust enrichment
if the plaintiff received the counterperformance specified by the parties’
unenforceable agreement.25
22. Id. § 62 cmt. b.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 (1967).
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 cmt. b
(2011).
25. It seems to me that A should be allowed restitution under § 32(1), which states:
"[r]estitution will be allowed, whether or not necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if
restitution is required by the policy of the underlying prohibition." Id. § 32. Nevertheless,
this is a difference of opinion regarding the best way to enforce the policy underlying
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Finally, Illustration 5 reads:
4.

Employee acts in an emergency to save the life of Employer,
sustaining crippling injuries as a result. (Compare § 20,
Illustration 7.) Believing that he faces legal liability for
Employee’s injuries, Employer continues for several years to pay
Employee a portion of his former wages. When Employer is
later advised (correctly) that applicable law gives him total
immunity from Employee’s claims, Employer discontinues these
payments and sues for restitution on the ground of mistake (§ 6).
Restitution will be denied. The reason is not that Employer acted
under a mistake of law (see § 5, Comment g), but that under the
26
circumstances Employee has not been unjustly enriched.

This Illustration is based on the famed case of Webb v. McGowin,27 although
Webb is a contracts case focused on whether an already conferred benefit can
serve as consideration.28
The result stands in contrast to Section 20, especially Illustration 7,
where the non-professional rescuer is denied a claim in restitution against the
rescued party.29 It is tempting to try to distinguish the cases based on the
voluntariness of the exchange, along the lines of Kull’s attempt to distinguish
Illustration 8 in Section 18 from Illustration 1 in Section 62. In Section 20
Illustration 7, the court refused to compel payment from the rescued party
and thereby prevented an involuntary exchange.30 In Section 62 Illustration
5, the payments were made voluntarily, hence the court protected payments
voluntarily made.31 Yet the "voluntary" transaction in Section 62 is the result
of a mistake, which normally gives rise to a claim in restitution under Section
5.32 The only salient difference between Illustration 5 and those cases that
fall under Section 5 is that Illustration 5 involves an act of rescue. However,
Section 18 states that the act of rescue does not ground a legal obligation.33
Thus, Illustration 5 is at variance with the rest of the Restatement.
Still, the result of Illustration 5 can be accommodated without making
use of the rules of Section 62. The disabled employee almost certainly has a
gambling prohibitions and not a disagreement about the underlying restitution principles.
26. Id. § 62 cmt. b.
27. Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. App. 1935).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 cmt. d, illus. 7 (1967).
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20 (2011).
30. See id.
31. See id. § 62 cmt. b.
32. See id. § 5.
33. See id. § 18.
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change of position defense under Section 65.34 This will block the restitution
claim, which is the result in Illustration 5. This will not, however, explain the
result in Webb, which was the creation of an enforceable contract.35
In sum, Illustrations 1 and 2 are incorrect because they are grossly
inconsistent with the principles found in other sections of the Restatement, while
Illustrations 3–5 (and 3*) can be explained using principles from other sections.
However, before we can conclude that the Restatement should not have included
Section 62, we must look at the case law that forms the basis of the illustrations. If
a large or prominent body of case law supports the results or reasoning found in
Illustrations 1–2, then eliminating Section 62 would have resulted in a significant
loss of explanatory power. Likewise, if a large or prominent body of case law
supports the reasoning used in Illustrations 3–5 (and 3*), then explaining them
instead with alternative reasoning would have caused a similar decrease in
explanatory power. The next section undertakes this requisite analysis.
IV. The Cases Inadequately Support the Illustrations
The support given to the Illustrations by the cases Kull cites fails to
overcome the inconsistency the Illustrations generate within the Restatement.
Illustrations 1–4 are all drawn from hypothetical cases discussed by Lord
Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan.36 Mansfield wrote:
It [an action for restitution] lies only for money which, ex aequo et bono, the
defendant ought to refund: it does not lie for money paid by the plaintiff,
which is claimed of him as payable in point of honor and honesty, although it
could not have been recovered from him by any course of law; as in payment
of a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations, or contracted during his infancy,
or to the extent of principal and legal interest upon an usurious contract, or, for
money fairly lost at play: because in all these cases, the defendant may retain
it with a safe conscience, though by positive law he was barred from
37
recovering.

34. See id. § 65 reporter’s note c; see also Westamerica Sec., Inc. v. Cornelius, 520 P.2d
1262 (1974); Woolsey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (W.D. Ark. 1988); State
ex rel. Steger v. Garber, 1979 WL 207282 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). But see United States v. Smith,
182 F. Supp. 503, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
35. See Webb, 168 So. at 196.
36. Moses, 2 Burr. at 1005.
37. Id. at 1012 (cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 62 reporter’s note b (2011)).
* This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section 62
has since been removed from the final version.
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While Moses is a famous case, it is worrisome that this portion of it serves
as the basis for over half the illustrations in Section 62.
The portion quoted above is dicta very far removed from the holding
in Moses. The quoted portion and all of Section 62 involve denying a
plaintiff’s claim to restitution, while the court in Moses actually upheld the
action for restitution.38 The discussion that Kull cites occurs in the midst of
Manfield’s sermon extolling the virtues of unjust enrichment claims, which
were new claims at the time. Part of Mansfield’s attempt to encourage
actions in restitution generally is arguing that such actions will not produce
results that are repugnant to the legal minds of his time. This grand
undertaking is hardly necessary to decide Moses; it is Mansfield pursuing a
broad public policy goal. Furthermore, Kull cannot claim that Mansfield’s
rhetoric is an accurate outline of unjust enrichment, because in Section 16
the Restatement itself allows a minor to rescind a contract he accepted,
which contradicts one of Mansfield’s claims.39
Moreover, Moses is over 200 years old, and hence is a bit outdated as a
statement of the law of restitution. In fact, Kull himself argues this very
point in Section 1 where he argues that Mansfield’s equity-heavy
conception of restitution should be supplanted by the more positivist
conception captured by Kull’s term "unjustified enrichment."40 Thus, using
Moses as the basis for the illustrations in Section 62 creates a dilemma. On
the one hand, Kull has claimed that Moses is a poor description of the
current state of the law of restitution.41 On the other hand, he uses the very
same dicta that he criticized from Moses as the basis for four illustrations in
Section 62.42 One of these positions must be abandoned for the sake of
consistency, and the former seems more accurate than the latter.
Thus, Moses offers little support for keeping Section 62 unchanged.
However, Kull cites other, more recent cases as well. Illustration 1 is based
on In re South Shore Co-op Ass’n,43 Clifton Manufacturing Co. v. United
States,44 and Jordan v. Bergsma.45 It is best to consider each case
individually. The only case from the last seventy years is Jordan, which
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 (2011).
See id. § 1 cmt. b.
See id.
See id. § 62 reporter’s note b.
In re South Shore Co-op Ass’n, 103 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1939).
Clifton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1935).
Jordan v. Bergsma, 822 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
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was a state appellate court decision.46 Kull himself notes that it is
"unlikely that the decision is a sound illustration of more general
principles of unjust enrichment."47 Further, this decision makes use of the
distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of nonclaim which
was shown to be irrelevant to Illustration 1.48
In addition to drawing the distinction between statutes of nonclaim and
statutes of limitations, the court also justifies its decision on contractual
grounds, writing:
This principle [that the debt is not extinguished after the statute of
limitations has run] is further supported by the general rule of contract
law that a new promise to pay an obligation made after the statute of
limitations has run on that obligation is still an enforceable promise. [I]f
a debtor makes a new promise to his creditor to pay a debt that has
already become unenforceable by operation of a statute of limitations,
this promise is enforceable in accordance with its own terms without
any new consideration. It is supported by the "past consideration."
Though the debtor was protected by a legal bar, he is regarded as still
under a moral obligation to pay the barred debt. . . . Corbin, Contracts
§ 214, at 289–90 (1963). The obligation is not erased by the statute of
49
limitations but merely made unenforceable in court.

This contractual argument is worth noting because it provides a justification
for the result in Illustration 1 that is not founded on principles of restitution.
Section 82 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:
1. A promise to pay all or part of an antecedent contractual
or quasi-contractual indebtedness owed by the promisor
is binding if the indebtedness is still enforceable or would
be except for the effect of a statute of limitations.
2. The following facts operate as such a promise unless
other facts indicate a different intention:
a) A voluntary acknowledgment to the obligee,
admitting the present existence of the antecedent
indebtedness; or
b) A voluntary transfer of money, a negotiable
instrument, or other thing by the obligor to the

46. See generally id.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 reporter’s
note b (2011).
48. See supra notes 9–18 and accompanying text.
49. Jordan, 822 P.2d at 329.
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obligee, made as interest on or part payment of or
collateral security for the antecedent indebtedness[.]50
In cases like Illustration 1, applying this contract doctrine, which in
effect allows a prior event to act as consideration for a present promise to
pay, creates an enforceable contract upon the obligor’s payment. As a valid
contract preempts any restitution claim, the obligor has no claim in
restitution.51 Hence the very case cited in the Restatement points the way to
a clearer explanation than the one given by the Restatement.52 Therefore,
Jordan offers little support to Illustration 1.
Turning to the older cases, South Shore has a better pedigree than
Jordan, for it is a Second Circuit opinion.53 Admittedly, the very brief
opinion in South Shore states: "[the plaintiffs’] position . . . [is not] bettered
by the fact that they paid a debt against which the statute of limitations
might have been pleaded."54 However, this judgment was secondary to the
court’s determination that the plaintiff’s payment to a trustee in bankruptcy,
to whom the plaintiffs owed no money, instead of the creditors, to whom
the plaintiffs owed money, did not qualify as a mistake sufficient to void
the transfer because the trustee was bound by law to give the money to the
creditors anyway.55 Yet, it would be disingenuous to characterize the
court’s rejection of the statute of limitations issue as dicta, for that step was
necessary for the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s case. South Shore
unequivocally supports the reasoning in Illustration 1.
That said, the discussion of the statute of limitations issue in Kelly
Asphalt, cited by the court in South Shore to support its position, is dicta.56
In Kelly Asphalt, the president and half owner of the plaintiff company paid
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82 (1979).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 (2011).
52. It may be that the justification for this contract doctrine is based on the same
equitable considerations discussed in § 62 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution.
Whether or not those considerations create a tension in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts similar to one they create in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution is beyond the
scope of this Article. Even if they did generate a similar tension, that is no reason to keep
Section 62 unchanged. We ought not to allow a nettlesome doctrine from one area of the
law to infect other areas. That the doctrine fits poorly with one restatement is no reason to
put it in another restatement.
53. South Shore, 103 F.2d at 336.
54. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 61 (1937) and Kelly Asphalt
Block Co. v. Brooklyn Alcatraz Asphalt Co., 180 N.Y.S. 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920)
(citations omitted)).
55. See South Shore, 103 F.2d at 337–38.
56. See Kelly Asphalt, 180 N.Y.S. at 806.
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a debt due to the defendant company, which was entirely owned by him,
after the statute of limitations had run with respect to that debt.57 The court
did say that the "Statute of Limitations may not be invoked and used by the
plaintiff to enforce the return of moneys paid in good faith to discharge a
debt honestly due."58 However, the court also found that "the directors of a
corporation have power to waive a Statute of Limitations as against a debt
justly due and owing."59 A mistake relating to the application of the statute
of limitations cannot void a valid waiver of the right to raise a statute of
limitations defense because the purpose of the waiver is to resolve the issue
of the statute of limitations.60 Hence, if the president’s action is viewed as a
waiver, then any claim to restitution based on the running of the statute of
limitations is misguided.
A stronger statement in support of the reasoning underlying
Illustration 1 can be found in the 1906 case of House v. Carr,61 upon which
Kelly Asphalt heavily relied.62 Justice Vann’s dissent states: "[I]t is a
general principle that the Statute of Limitations may be used as a shield but
not as a sword."63 Yet the majority opinion does not go that far, merely
stating: "[I]t is settled law, as appears by the cases cited in my brother
Vann’s opinion, that equity will not set aside as a cloud upon title a lien
outlawed by the Statute of Limitations."64 Moreover, even the majority
opinion’s tempered support for the reasoning behind Illustration 1 is
mitigated by the fact that the New York legislature overruled its
interpretation of the relevant statute of limitations with the addition of
subdivision 4 to section 500 of New York’s Real Property Law in 1948.65
Turning back to cases cited in the Restatement, Clifton seems to offer
strong support for the reasoning of Illustration 1.66 Like South Shore, it is a
57. Id. at 805–06.
58. Id. at 808.
59. Id at 809.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 (2011)
(stating that "[a] claimant bears the risk of a mistake when (a) the risk is allocated to the
claimant by agreement of the parties; (b) the claimant has consciously assumed the risk by
deciding to act in the face of a recognized uncertainty; or (c) allocation to the claimant of the
risk in question accords with the common understanding of the transaction concerned").
61. House v. Carr, 78 N.E. 171 (N.Y. 1906).
62. See Kelly Asphalt, 180 N.Y.S. at 805.
63. House, 78 N.E. at 178 (Vann, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 174.
65. See Garden City Country Club, Inc. v. Aldworth, 19 Misc. 2d 352, 353 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1959).
66. See Clifton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 577, 578 (4th Cir. 1935).
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federal circuit opinion that offers unequivocal support for the result in
Illustration 1, stating: "It is of great significance that the taxpayer was in
truth indebted to the United States for taxes in the amount which it paid."67
It is also similar to South Shore in that it offers a strained reading of the
precedent upon which it relies. In Clifton the plaintiff is a taxpayer who,
"[o]n June 25, 1923, more than five years after the first return . . . executed
a waiver effective for one year from date, wherein it consented to a
determination, assessment, and collection of the taxes for the year 1918,
under section 250(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921."68 He was suing to
recover the taxes he paid on that assessment because the waiver was
executed after the statute of limitations had expired. There was ample
precedent to establish that such a waiver was valid despite having been
executed after the statute of limitations had run.69 Nevertheless, none of
those cases discussed whether the taxpayer knew that the limitations period
had expired when he signed the waiver. Of all those cases, the most likely
to involve a taxpayer with that knowledge was Burnet v. Chicago Railway
Co.,70 and yet even the Clifton court admitted that "the decision [in Burnet]
does not expressly show whether the taxpayer was also of the opinion that
the period of limitations had not expired when the waiver was given."71
This casts doubt upon the Clifton court’s assumption that the results in the
aforementioned precedent would not change even if the taxpayers had
demonstrated that they believed the limitations period had not expired.
Furthermore, even granting the Clifton court that assumption, the
court’s conclusion that the expiration of the statute of limitations provides
no basis for a restitution claim does not follow. The results in the
aforementioned cases comport entirely with the substance of Section 5 of
the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment.72 When a
taxpayer executes a waiver allowing the IRS to assess taxes for a given
year, either the waiver expressly allocates the risk of the limitations period
running, or the taxpayer consciously assumes the risk that the period has
run by deciding to act in the face of a recognized uncertainty, or allocating
67. Id. at 581.
68. Id. at 578.
69. See Helvering v. Newport Co., 291 U.S. 485, 488 (1933); McDonnell v. United
States, 288 U.S. 420 (1933); W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Burnet, 282 U.S. 283, 287
(1931); Burnet v. Chicago Railway Equipment Co., 282 U.S. 295, 299 (1931); Stange v.
United States, 282 U.S. 270 (1931).
70. Burnet, 282 U.S. at 295.
71. Clifton, 76 F.2d at 581.
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 (2011).
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such risk to him accords with the common understanding of the transaction
concerned. Any of these circumstances would bar his mistake claim under
Section 5.73 Accordingly, Clifton’s analysis shares the same flaws as that of
Kelly Asphalt; namely, it takes a mistake claim that fails because of the
nature of the agreement—a waiver in both cases—and uses it to create a
much broader rule regarding all restitution claims based on the expiration of
the statute of limitations.
As the preceding discussion shows, South Shore, Kelly’s Asphalt,
House, and Clifton all offer some support for the reasoning underlying
Illustration 1. However, the age of the cases tempers the strength of this
support. The cases were all decided prior to 1940, when Mansfield’s
equitable conception of restitution had greater currency than it does today.
The weaknesses in their analyses, discussed above, further diminish the
strength of their support. Moreover, all of them except for Clifton were
decided using the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law
that the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment advocates
abolishing.74 Thus, the Restatement does not fully accommodate those
cases despite their inclusion in Section 62.
Jordan provides similarly attenuated support. Jordan is much more
recent than the cases mentioned above, but it is also much more poorly
reasoned.75 Even Kull admits that it is not useful as a statement of general
principles of restitution.76 Additionally, the contract doctrine that creates a
valid contract upon payment of an expired debt may be doing most of the
doctrinal work in reaching the result in Jordan.77
Having examined the strengths and weaknesses of the case law
supporting Illustration 1, we can now answer the question of whether the
support it gives is sufficient to overcome the advantages that would be
gained by removing Illustration 1. The weighing of theoretical virtues is a
subtle and complicated matter.78 This portion of my argument is likely to
73. See id.
74. See South Shore, 103 F.2d at 336; House, 185 N.Y. at 453; Kelly Asphalt, 180
App. Div. at 750; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 cmt. g
(2011).
75. Jordan v. Bergsma, 822 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 reporter’s
note b (2011).
77. Jordan, 822 P.2d at 319.
78. See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in THE
ESSENTIAL TENSION 320, 320–39 (1977); David Lewis, New Work for a Theory of
Universals, 61 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL.343, 343–77 (1983).
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draw the most criticism, because I am arguing that the Illustration should
have been omitted despite clear support in the case law. Nonetheless, given
the flaws of the aforementioned cases and that the Restatement cannot fully
accommodate most of them regardless of their inclusion in Section 62, I
think the cases fail to justify the inclusion of Illustration 1 in the
Restatement.
The cases underlying the rest of the illustrations from Section 62 can
be more easily dismissed. Illustration 2 is based on the 120-year-old case
of Pensacola & A.R. Co. v. Braxton.79 This case simply does not support
the Illustration.80 The recipient of the money in Pensacola had no
knowledge of the mistake, and hence has a defense as a payee without
notice under Section 67.81 Further, the facts of Pensacola raised no concern
that the other creditor would go unpaid. Hence the court decided the case
by consolidating two separate debts: The judge refused to set off the
plaintiff’s damages on a tort claim by the amount the defendant paid by
mistake because the jury found that the defendant owed the plaintiff that
amount as payment for damages from another incident.82 The case contains
the rhetoric concerning forbidding restitution where the money can be kept
in good conscience that one would expect in a case from the 1894, but it is
merely rhetoric, nothing more.83
Illustration 3* is based on the part of South Shore not dealing with the
statute of limitations issue.84 The facts of the case support the Illustration,
but the court’s reasoning does not. The court cites the Restatement (First)
of Restitution Section 60, which treats the existence of enforceable duty to
transferee as a defense to a restitution claim.85 While the current Section 62
incorporates many of the illustrations falling under the previous Section 60,
Section 62 of the current version is clearly the progeny of the former
Section 61, entitled "Existence Of Moral Duty By Transferor,"86 which was
79. Pensacola & A.R. Co. v. Braxton, 16 So. 317 (Fla. 1894).
80. Compare Pensacola, 16 So. at 317, with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
& UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 reporter’s note b (2011).
81. See Pensacola, 16 So. at 320; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 67 (2011).
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 (2011).
83. See id.
84. See South Shore, 103 F.2d at 336–38.
85. See id. at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 60 (1937)).
86. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 61 (1937).
* This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section
62 has since been removed from the final version.
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used by the South Shore court to justify its decision on the statute of
limitations issue.87 Hence we cannot assume that the reasoning from the old
Section 60, which the South Shore court uses, is equivalent to the reasoning
of the current Section 62. In fact, treating the existence of enforceable duty
to transferee as a defense to a restitution claim seems more in line with the
reasoning found in Section 67 in the current version.88 Ergo, the reasoning
upon which the court in South Shore relied is likely the reasoning currently
found in Section 67, not Section 62, of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment.
Illustration 3* is also supported by the 1870 case of Board of
Supervisors v. Manny,89 in which the court ignored the technical deficiencies
in the tax assessment and allowed the taxing authority to keep the money paid
by the taxpayer. However, it seems that the court thought the deficiencies in
the assessment were insufficient to invalidate the tax.90 Moreover, the court
believed that correcting the deficiencies would have resulted in the plaintiff
owing the same amount of tax. Thus the court’s reasoning can be explained
as consolidation of (1) a judgment that the defendant is liable in restitution,
and (2) a judgment that the plaintiff is liable on the debt. The court allows
(1) to be offset by (2) with the result that the defendant owes no money.91
The absence of any other creditors in the case,92 and the high priority given to
tax debt,93 eliminate the problems that doomed Illustration 2.94 Hence, Board
of Supervisors offers little support for the reasoning in Illustration 3*.95

87. See South Shore, 103 F.2d at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION
§ 60 (1937)).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 (2011).
89. Bd. of Supervisors v. Manny, 56 Ill. 160 (Ill. 1870).
90. Id. at 162–63 (noting that the plaintiff was under a legal and equitable obligation
to pay the tax).
91. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
92. See Bd. of Supervisors, 56 Ill. at 160–63.
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2006).
94. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
95. Here one may object that I am ignoring Restatement (Third) of Restitution &
Unjust Enrichment Section 19, specifically cmt. f of that Section, which discusses the
application of Section 62 to illegal taxation claims. I am not. In Section 19 Kull states that
"a claim in restitution to recover payments of taxes has usually been treated as sui generis,
and principles thought to be specially applicable to tax cases usually determine the
outcome." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT at § 19 cmt. a. I
treat them as such as well.
* This Illustration (Illustration 3 in a Tentative Draft of the Restatement) of Section
62 has since been removed from the final version.
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Illustration 3 is based on the antiquated case of Buel v. Boughton.96
Again, the facts support the Illustration, but it is not clear that the reasoning
of the court follows that of the Illustration. The Buel court clearly
contemplates a string of liabilities based on reforming the note and finds that
such a series would end with the same state of affairs in which the parties
currently find themselves.97 The court efficiently applies all of those
reformations in one fell swoop and thus bars the unjust enrichment claim.98
Illustration 4 is based on the nearly bicentennial case of Babcock v.
Thompson.99 It is perplexing that Kull chose to base an illustration in Section
62 on this case. He is correct in that the Babcock court takes "the denial of
restitution for money ‘fairly lost at play’ . . . for granted."100 Yet, the holding in
Babcock is that the doctrine of equitable disqualification/unclean hands bars the
plaintiff from recovering money that the defendant cheated out of him in illegal
gambling.101 Kull is obviously aware of this, for he uses Babcock as the basis
for an illustration in the section on equitable disqualification.102
If the cheated plaintiff is barred from recovering on the basis of equitable
disqualification, then a fortiori the plaintiff who lost the money in fair play is
barred from recovery as well. Thus, the most charitable and plausible reason
for the court in Babcock to assume that the plaintiff cannot recover money lost
in fair gambling is on the basis of equitable disqualification—the same basis
upon which they decided the case. Why Kull would think otherwise, given his
knowledge of the case, is puzzling.
Finally, Illustration 5 is based on the famed case of Webb v. McGowin.103
Webb is a contracts case dealing with whether a promisee’s past act of rescuing
the promisor can serve as consideration to make the promise enforceable.104
The court found that the past act of rescue could serve as consideration,
writing:
It follows that if, as alleged in the complaint, appellant saved J. Greeley
McGowin from death or grievous bodily harm, and McGowin
96. Buel v. Boughton, 2 Denio 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846).
97. Id. at 93–94.
98. Id. at 94.
99. Babcock v. Thompson, 20 Mass. 446 (1826).
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 62 reporter’s note b (citing Babcock, 20
Mass. at 446).
101. See Babcock, 20 Mass. at 449.
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 63 cmt. b,
illus. 1 (2011).
103. Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. App. 1935).
104. See id.
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subsequently agreed to pay him for the service rendered, it became a valid
and enforceable contract.105

Kull had to modify the case for the Illustration, because merely barring
the restitution claim is not the remedy in the actual case, which was to
make the promise a contract. The principles in Section 62 only allow the
promisee to keep the money he has already received,106 while the doctrine
of Webb allows him to continue to receive payments in addition to the
money he already received.107 Webb is commonly viewed as a contracts
case, serving as part of the foundation for Section 86 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, entitled "Promise For Benefit Received."108
Much like the contractual principle discussed in Jordan,109 the
contractual principle followed in Webb creates a valid contract that
thereby blocks any potential restitution claims. As it did with Illustration
1 and Jordan,110 the Restatement again incorporates a misfit contract
doctrine at the expense of simplicity and internal consistency. As a
contracts case that does not comment on restitution, Webb does not
support the reasoning behind Illustration 5.
V. Conclusion
Sentimental lawyers cherish an old trope: they say that law
works itself pure.111
This Article urges that the Restatement should not have included
Section 62. In doing so it argues for three theses: (1) Section 62 is a
source of great dissonance within the Restatement, (2) Section 62
produces holdings that are either wrong or attainable by using alternative
principles, and (3) the support given to the principles of Section 62 by the
case law is inadequate to outweigh the problems the Section causes, that
is, the gains in consistency to be had from removing the Section are
greater than the loss in explanatory power that results from the cases
going unexplained.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 198.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 62 (2011).
See Webb, 168 So. at 198.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 reporter’s note d (1979).
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 reporter’s note d (1979).
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 400 (1986).
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The remonstration of (1) leaves, I think, little room for doubt. (2) is
more dubious, but not very much so. (3) is certainly the most
controversial. To accommodate as many cases as possible is a laudable
goal, but we ought to be careful lest it thwart other equally important goals
such as consistency and simplicity. (1) and (2) show that omitting Section
62 would have significantly improved the law of restitution. The law may
work itself pure, but occasionally there are opportunities to help it along.
The Restatement missed one such opportunity by including Section 62.

